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THE ROLE OF THE LABOUR BUREAUX
IN SOUTH AFRICA:
A Critique of the Riekert Commission Report.
- D.C. Hindson .
. . . it seems to us Natives that you want our labour, but as soon as you
have finished with us you want us removed so far away from you that you
do not want to see us until certain hours when you again want our labour.
We are just so many horses that have to be stabled after they have been
working — just as though we are not human beings.
. . Union of South Africa, Report of the Native Economic Commission,
.. 1930-32, U.G. 22. of 1932, 220.
Following the Riekert Commission Report1 and the subsequent White Paper1
which appeared in 1979, important changes of a certain kind may be expected in
South Africa's labour bureaux system. Only the main outlines of the proposed
changes are described in the recommendations of the Commission Report. The
details have yet to be fully worked out. For the final official blueprint it is
necessary to await the outcome of the report of the Public Services Commission
and a round of Parliamentary debates on the proposed Employment and Training
Act and the Black Community Development Act.4
In the meantime the State in its day-to-day running of the labour bureaux and
other machinery of control has not stood still. It has already taken practical steps
towards implementing some of the Riekert recommendations. The 'moratorium'
on illegal workers, which ended in October 1979, was a step towards increasing
control over this section of the workforce, something the Commission felt was an
essential pre-requisite for implementing its more liberal recommendations. More
recently desultory attempts have been made to relax the 72-hour restriction on
Africans remaining in the towns without special permission, one of the most
important liberalising' measures recommended by the Commission. The ten-
tativeness of the State over the 72-hour restriction as compared with its eagerness
over registration of illegal workers gives a foretaste of what may be expected from
the new dispensation.* . . . .
The object of this paper is to advance the understanding of the role of the
labour bureaux system in South Africa through an analysis and critique of the
Riekert Report and especially those of its recommendations which deal with the
labour bureaux and legislation governing their operation.
The paper is divided into four main sections. The first discusses approaches
that have already been adopted in the analysts of the labour bureaux system and
shows in fairly abstract terms how the approach and method of analysis in this
paper differs from these. In the second section the status and role of the Commis-
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sion itself as a particular mechanism of the State is briefly discussed; This paves
the way for section three, where there is a discussion of the contents of the
Report. Section three, which is the longest, is divided into three parts. The first
deals with the 'points of departure* of the Report, the second with the proposed
changes in the legislation governing the operation of the labour bureaux and their
relation to government departments. The last section discusses the adequacy of
the Riekert proposals in coming to terms with certain underlying contradictions
which have developed during the process of capitalist expansion in South Africa.
Existing Approaches to the Anaylsis of the Labour Bureaux
Existing analytical approaches to the labour bureaux system fall roughly into
three categories: liberal, Marxist, and apologetic. Of these only the first two will
be referred to in this section since we are concerned here with the critical analysis
of the system.6 . . . .
Writers in the liberal academic tradition, most of whom have worked within
the framework of neo-classical economics, have in general criticised the labour
bureau system in terms of its failure to operate as a mechanism of allocation of
labour. In their argument the commitment of the labour bureaux to the function
of the influx control has resulted in a mis-allocation of labour between regions,
sectors and occupations in 'the economy'. They argue from this that the bureaux
have the effect of lowering the productivity of labour and thus reducing the
economically attainable levels of output and economic growth. The pursuit of in-
flux control as a means of furthering the goals of apartheid is seen to be in opposi-
tion not only to the interests of the economy in general, entrepreneurs and
labourers, but more particularly to those expanding and progressive sectors, such
as manufacturing industry, which are denied free access to African labour. The
interests of employers in these sectors in particular, also the interests of the
economy as a whole, lie in the conversion of the labour bureaux system into an ef-
ficient mechanism of labour allocation, and the abandonment or at least down-
playing of their influx control function.' . •
The distinctive feature of this approach is its concentration on market rela-
tions, on the sphere of circulation of labour. Here it finds a real though limited
contradiction between the tendencies of capitalist expansion in the various
branches of production as expressed through the labour market, and the opera-
tion of the labour bureaux. However, by perceiving all relations essentially
through the lens of the market, there is a tendency to invert the real relation
between production and the sphere of circulation, so that the latter determines
the former. What is not more than limited contradiction is presented, in this
approach, as a fundamental opposition between the State and the economy, bet-
ween the interests especially of the manufacturing sector and the State.
In diametrical opposition to this, most writers in the Marxist tradition have
presented the labour bureaux as functioning unproblematically in the intrerests of
capital by guaranteeing a cheap and politically weak African workforce, and/or
as functioning to resolve competition between fractions of capital over supplies of
African workers by allocating these supplies according to the political force exer-
cised by them within the State. No contradiction is found between the labour
bureaux functions of labour allocation and influx control. The bureaux function
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in such a way as to meet both the immediate economic interests of capital through
the exercise of their labour channelling function and its political interests by
locating the industrial reserve army in the rural areas, where it becomes weak and
isolated, through the exercise of influx control. Furthermore, influx control is
functional to capital in so far as it reduces the cost of reproduction which would
have to be met if workers and their families were to live permanently in the town.1
A feature of these writings, as well as those of the liberals, is that they do not
draw a clear distinction between the legislation and the machinery of control.
Very often the arguments are supported by reference to the legislation or to
statements by administrators about the formal objectives of the system and thus
the official perception of the bureaux attaining all objectives simultaneously and
unproblematically is reproduced.
In contrast to the liberal approach the distinctive feature of most Marxist
writings is their attempt to analyse the direct connection between the operation of
the bureaux and relations in the immediate sphere of production — relations of
exploitation. No attention is given to their effects on labour market conditions —
it is merely assumed that the market is superceded by bureaucratic labour alloca-
tion. The basic argument advanced is that the labour bureaux system makes it
possible for capital to maintain a high level of exploitation of African labour by
weakening workers in their relations with employers at the work place and
guaranteeing the reproduction of cheap labour-power by enforcing the system of
temporary migration. - :
This approach has the merit of relating state intervention to the fundamental
processes of production and reproduction in the social system. But the explana-
tion advanced is reductionist. It fails to grasp what is peculiar to the functions of
the labour bureaux, namely that they relate to the management and control of the
labour market and only in this way, indirectly, have an impact on the immediate
sphere of production and on the manner in which labour-power is reproduced.
The limitations in existing Marxist analyses arise out of their debate with
liberal writers over the question of the functionality of the apartheid State to
capital. Liberals said that apartheid was in opposition to the economy,
economically irrational, and would frustrate economic growth. Marxists replied
that the apartheid State was an instrument of capital and facilitated capitalist
expansion. Where liberals saw monolithic irrationality, Marxists saw monolithic
and noncontradictory functionality. They simply inverted the liberal position. In
doing so they also unwittingly helped to reproduce one important aspect of the
State's projected image of itself. They found a consistency and coherence in the
apartheid State's programme and policies where in reality there was only the
appearance of consistency, where fundamentally the State merely contained and
reproduced, both within itself and in society, the contradictions of capitalist pro-
duction and the chaos of its markets. : . . .
In the approach adopted in this paper it is the contradictory containment and
execution of both the allocation and influx control functions within a single
specialised apparatus of the 5tate, the labour bureaux, that becomes the focus of
attention. The analysis proceeds neither by attempting to play down the direct
economic role of the labour bureaux in allocating workers or the real conflicts
that exist between efficient execution of the labour allocation function and effec-
tive control over the movement of Africans to the towns and their conditions of
urban residence. Instead, this conflicting co-existence of functions and its
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significance in the functioning of the labour bureaux both in relation to the State's
overall programme and in direct relation to classes and class interests becomes the
subject matter of analysis.
Priority has almost always been given by the labour bureaux to influx control
and expulsion measures rather than labour allocation. The labour allocation
function, the provision of so-called employment services, has characteristically
been subordinated to control over movement and residence. The problem is
therefore to explain the nature and significance of the containment of these con-
tradictory functions within this apparatus as well as the subordination of alloca-
tion measures to other more direct forms of control. This takes us to the general
question of the status of contradiction within the State and its connection with the
class character of the State.
In the approach adopted here the State is seen as both a material condensation
of class relations and as a mechanism of containment and management of class
contradictions.* These two aspects must be amplified.
First, as a material condensation of class relations the State reflects, but is not
directly reducible to, class relations. It is not a simple microcosmic representation
of those relations. In order to achieve its functions of maintaining the cohesion of
the social formation, of securing the conditions of reproduction of the relations of
domination and subordination under capitalism, it cannot simply appear to stand
apart from the classes in combat, but must in reality operate to some extent in-
dependently of them. The State has an organisational form, mode of operation
and independence of action, in short, an 'institutional materiality*, which gives it
a relative autonomy in relation to classes in society. Its power derives from and is
determined by class power but it exercises this power relatively independently of
those classes.10 How relative this autonomy is, is a question which must be
answered concretely in each circumstance with due regard to both the limits im-
posed by the particular forms of capital accumulation and the struggles to which
these give rise."
Classes may be 'present' within the State apparatuses 'directly' or only 'at a
distance'.11 The latter concept attempts to grasp the case where classes have
effects on the internal organisation and functioning of the apparatuses but where
they are physically absent as a class within the apparatus. The notion of'presence
at a distance' is of particular importance m South Africa given the 'racially
exclusive'11 character of the South African State. Formal exclusion in this sense
does not, however, mean that the effects of popular class struggles are not felt
within even the most repressive branches of the State. The question that needs to
be answered is how these effects are transmitted to the apparatuses and how they
are translated into the terms of their operation. These questions cannot be
satisfactorily answered within the confines of this paper, but certain steps in this
direction are offered in the section dealing with the proposed modifications in the
Bantu Affairs Administration Boards.14
The second aspect of the character of the State which must be amplified is that
relating to the role of the State in containing contradictions, in maintaining the
conditions (economic, political and ideological) which are necessary to the further
development of capitalist production relations. It is at this point that the
approach adopted in this paper departs most decisively from existing work on the
labour bureaux system and the State in South Africa. The crucial point here is
that the State has the effect not only of containing these contradictions but also of
The Role of the Labour Bureaux 1S3
;• reproducing them within its own structures, its mode of operation, its pro-
grammes and policies. . - . - : •
The contradictions reproduced within and between State apparatuses are not
microscopic repetitions of the contradictory development of capitalist production
relations. They take a form which is sprcific to the organisation, functiona]
specialisation and logic of operation of the State itself. Furthermore, they are
expressed and develop differentially within and between branches of the State
according to the degree of presence, or absence, of the dominant and dominated
classes in those apparatuses. In other words the contradictory character of the
apparatuses, the weight given to the various aspects of their practical operation
depends upon their history and characteristics as centres of the execution of class
power.li -
A further point must be made. The State in the execution of its functions of
containment of class contradictions not only reproduces these contradictions in
refracted form within its own material structures, but it reproduces the contradic-
tions amongst classes themselves. At one level this is obvious. In securing the con-
ditions of the further development of capitalist production relations, it also
secures the conditions for the further development of classes and hence class con-
tradictions. However, there is a more specific issue to be considered. In so far as it
contains contradictions in certain spheres, the tendency also occurs for further
problems of containment to spring up elsewhere. Thus the very programmes
which the State formulates can in their own right give rise to the development,
even if displaced and transformed, of these contradictions. There is in other
words a tendency for the programmes and policies of the State to confound
themselves. Previous writers have often ignored or underplayed this aspect of the
South African State's policies, thus lending them an undeserved credibility.
What has been established so far is not more than a general tendency. Con-
tradiction and crisis do not arise merely out of the inevitable unfolding of
immutable laws, nor does the State's policy inevitably confound itself. It is the ac-
tion of classes in struggle, the action of agents 'distributed1 into class places and
hence subject to, but also capable of transforming these laws, that determines
5/ whether the tendencies present in the State's programmes come to the surface. It is
the intensity and forms of struggle which determine the manner of expression of
contraditions in the State, whether this happens through the exposure of mutually
inconsistent policies, the development of intra-and interdepartmental tensions
and struggles or a more profound restructuring of the various State apparatuses
and the relations between them.16 "• " ': .
For the purposes of this paper it is necessary to take the analysis one step
. further. Here we are concerned not so much with the State as a whole but with a
$[ particular apparatus of the State. It is therefore necessary to identify the more
specific functions of this apparatus. In the case of the labour bureaux their
primary, direct, role is to manage the process of circulation of labour, the labour
market. Concretely, this involves management of the movement of workers bet-
. ween individual capitals and between non-capitalist and capitalist production
units. It has the geographical dimension of management of movement between
the countryside and towns and between different towns.
. - But the manner in which this process is managed in South Africa is governed by
the particular role of the labour bureaux in the State's policy of containment of
the contradiction between the sphere of production and that of reproduction.
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The labour bureaux system does not function in the first place to contain con-
tradictions arising directly out of the relations between capital and labour in the
immediate sphere of production. For this there is the entire superstructure of
Industrial Councils, the Wages Board and so on. It acts in the first place to con-
tain the contradiction between capitalist production and its conditions of
reproduction, which in South Africa has involved a degree of maintenance of
precapitalist forms of production.17 However, its functions do not relate to all
aspects of this contradiction but are rather directed to the management and con-
tainment of the manifestation of this contradiction on the market for African
labour — the simultaneous growth of shortages of African labour and the struc-
tural tendency for capital to generate a growing surplus polulation. . .
The contradiction in the functioning of the labour bureaux arises fundamen-
tally from their dual role in containing the tendency of capital to undermine its
general external conditions of production and in securing the immediate re-
quirements of capital in the form of free and readily exploitable labour-power. In
South Africa state intervention in the social reproductive process before World
War II gave priority to the maintenance and reproduction of migratory labour,
but after the war it was re-designed to ensure the reproduction of differentiated
labour, temporary migrants and a growing settled urban proletariat. In perform-
ing this dual function the labour bureaux, along with other associated state
apparatuses, helped reproduce the central contradiction between capital and
labour through the management and displacement of contradictions in the labour
market — the reduction of labour surpluses in the towns and their displacement
to the countryside, the African Reserves and neighbouring countries.
In performing this function, the system failed to escape the effects of labour
market contradictions. In attempting at one and the same time to act as a
mechanism of recruitment and allocation of labour, on the one hand, and as a
mechanism of influx control and expulsion, on the other, it reproduced within its
own material composition the conflicts it sought to manage and contain. These
were expressed as conflicts between the labour placement and influx control func-
tions, which were performed by competing sub-apparatuses of each bureaux.
The particular expression of these contradictions in the functioning of the
labour bureaux, the degree to which priority has been given to one or other objec-
tive and even the degree of incompatibility of these objectives of influx control
and labour allocation, varied both historically and between regions and
individual bureaux. These variations are a result of the forms and intensity of the
struggles not only berween the different partners of capital which have laid claim
10 African labour-power through the labour bureaux but also of the dominated
African masses who have resisted labour bureau controls. The limited reformist
adaptations made to the system at various historical points have always been
preceded by intense direct struggle against passes and registration by Africans,
and by struggles between capitals over the allocation of African labour.
But the system has also been shaped historically by another form of struggle,
the temporary retreat of the individual migrant worker from wage labour and
capitalist exploitation in the towns to his home in the countryside. It is the
removal of the materials basts supporting this practice, the growth of monopoly
capitalist relations in industry and the related development of struggles in the
workplace and at the site of reproduction, in the townships, thai has called into
question the character and role of the labour bureaux system in the current
period. * . V.
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The Character and Role of the Riekert Commission
The Riekert Commission, like the labour bureaux system with which we are con-
cerned, is itself also an apparatus of the State. What are its distinctive
characteristics? • .
Like many commissions set up during phases of heightened contradiction and
crisis, this one may best be described as a conciliatory and deliberative branch of
the State's ideological apparatuses. The chairman and his panel of expert advisors
are in the nature of hired philosophers of the State. The Commission was con-
ciliatory in so far as it presentated itself as standing apart from both the State and
classes in society, willing to lend an impartial ear to any oi the parries at odds,
including the State as just one of the many parties. It was deliberative to the ex-
tent that it weighed up the evidence in a way that was intended to appear objec-
tive and formulated a plan intended to resolve disputes, correct errors in the
system and lay a foundation for future order and development. This plan was
then presented to the governing power for its further consideration.
These characteristics enabled the Commission to perform at least two distinct
functions. The first was that of deflecting demands made at the high point of
crises, in the heat of the moment, away from their object — the State, branches of
the State or capital itself. This was done by giving apparently impartial attention
to the grievances expressed by the various panics and by holding out the promise
that they would be taken into account by the State in the near future.11
The second, more profound and long-lasting function of the Commission was
to re-organise ideological relations amongst classes. A Commission sets the terms
of the debate within society in much the same way as its own terms of reference
are set for it by the State. " - " • .< •
Re-organisation of ideological relations in the case of the Riekert Commission
took the form of an attempted accommodation of apartheid and free-market
ideology. The re-assertion of free market ideology in the discourse of the State
reflected a changed balance amongst the dominant classes and in particular the
growing pressure of monopoly capital within the State.
The accommodation of apartheid and free-market ideology acts to organise the
relations amongst the dominant classes, and to disorganise those amongst the
dominated classes. In relation to the latter the Riekert recommendations
represented a particular expression of a class stra'tcgy — the strategy of division of
the African working class into rural and urban components and the limited incor-
poration of the African petty bourgeoisie into the processes of urban political
reproduction.
It is not only in the realm of ideas that the Commission played a role in re-
organising class relations. A primary function was to present a blueprint which
endorsed the re-organisation of those relations as expressed within the State. The
re-structuring of the machinery of control over the reproduction and allocation of
labour proposed by the Commission involved also the re-structuring of class rela-
tions within the State- . :. : ; • - • •
{ Now, it is important before turning" to the detailed proposals put forward by
the Commission to stand back and perceive it in relation to other attempts on the
part of the State to re-structure itself and its relations to society. The Riekert
: Commission proposals formed only one pan of an overall re-consideration of
' relations amongst the dominant classes and only part of a concerted re*
I.
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consideration of strategy towards the popular classes. It is common knowledge
chat whereas the RJekert Commission addressed itself to the sphere of reproduc-
tion and circulation of labour, its twin, the Wichahn Commission", was concern-
ed to order the direct relations between capital and labour at the place of work.
But this was not all. The struggles emanating both from the workplace and
from the site of reproduction, from the factories and the townships of South
Africa, represented only one manifestation of a regional and world re-alignment
of forces. The South African State is forced increasingly to consider not only the
political conditions for the further development of capital within South Africa,
but also in the Southern African region as a whole, and even further afield. The
formal recognition of this is captured in the two notions of a "total strategy' and a
'constellation of states'. The former arises out of the need to formulate a political
programme covering all spheres and levels of society in the face of mounting con-
flict within and outside of South Africa's borders. The notion of a 'constellation
of states' arises from the tendency of South African based capital to operate across
national boundaries on a sub-continental level and the necessity to secure its con-
ditions of reproduction at this level. -
Here a word of caution is needed. The State has not only to manage contradic-
tions but also to present itself as capable of managing them. The formulation of a
coherent overall strategy is an essential pan of this. The State must present
coherence and certainty where fundamentally it is capable only of containing and
reproducing the relations which give rise to incoherence and uncertainty. Thus it
is essential not only to look for and find the coherent side of the State's strategies,
their internal logic and guiding objectives, but also to seek out and expose the side
which is incoherent, inconsistent and filled with contradiction.
During the phase of capitalist expansion and stabilisation in the 1960s the
aspect of coherence in the apartheid State's policies had a real foundation. It was
based upon the suppression of popular class struggles and the organisations
which led them in the 1950s. In the present period of economic stagnation and
de-stabilisation, the incoherence of the State's policies, and the conflict-ridden
character of the apparatuses which execute them, all of which are always latent,
manifest themselves at every level from the lowest rungs of the State bureaucracies
to the highest points of its executive branches, from the petty official to the Prime
Minister. Now more than ever is it inexcusable to present the South African State
as a monolith..
 ; . . • . - . . , : : . . •
A Critique on the Riekert Commission Report
The limits within which the Riekert Commission was prepared to contemplate
reform in the system of labour control were set in the first paragraphs of the
Report. Here already can be found the ideological expressions of fundamental
contradictions and the attempt to contain them. The most obvious of these is the
conflict between the liberal ideology of the free market and the apartheid ideology
of total control over the movement and exchange of labour.10 Others, which are
discussed in the course of analysis of the specific recommendations are between
racial discrimination/non-discriminarion in legislation and machinery, centralisa-
tion/decentralisation of controls and the withdrawal of repression/increase in
repression associated with the control apparatuses.11 The intellectual task of the
Commission was to accommodate within a single coherent framework these con-
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tradicrions, as a foundation for the drawing up of its blueprint.
The terms of reference of the Commission dictated that it should investigate
legislation, regulations and administrative practices relating to 'any economic
aspect of the utilisation of manpower, with a view to the elimination of
bottlenecks, and other problems experienced by both employees and employers in
the utilisation of labour*22 (emphasis added, D.H.)- The Commission took it that
its brief was 'to make recommendations for the improvement, moderisation and
reform of the existing official institutional and statutory framework of the labour
market in South Africa, with a view to the better utilisation especially of Black
manpower . . ,'23 With this as the primary aim it adopted the following
fundamental principle: --
The effective functioning of the free labour market mechanism should be
the object to be achieved by, among other things, strategic direa and in-
direct Government intervention with a view to the elimination of existing
market failures, and by non-intervention where labour market results can-
not be significantly improved.24
This is a crucial point of departure. It implies that free play should be given to
the market mechanism subject only to intervention where this fails to give
economically optimal results, that is, the greatest possible level of efficiency in the
utilisation of manpower. But what of the political implications of the operation of
a free market, what of the fate of those apartheid institutions set up to manage
and constrain the movement of workers? The Commission gives only this answer:
The political factors underlying the legislation to which the Commission's
.. terms of reference relate fall out of the scope of the Commission's
enquiry."
'* All of the apanhcid State's control apparatuses are thus treated only as labour
|. market institutions'." It is in this way that the Commission attempts to leave out-
side of its scope of enquiry the question of the relation between the labour market
and the political character of the institutions of apartheid. The conflict between
free market and apartheid idiology, as well as the real, though limited, contradic-
tion between market forces and the operation of the machinery of labour control
are obscured by declaring politics to be outside the scope of its concern.
However, the contradiction does not occur only at this level. The notion of a
free labour market, while it refers to a real phenomenon is no less impregnated
*. with ideological significance than that of total labour control. This raises a
S further question: What role does the notion of 'free labour market', especially in
j | . its contorted embrace with that of 'total labour control', play in obscuring the
character of emerging relations of production and reproduction that underlie and
determine relations of exchange?17 This is dealt with in a later section of the
paper. Here only the more general effects of the accommodation between liberal
and apanheid ideology will be brought out.
First, the accommodation has the effect of masking the emergence and con-
!$". solidation of relations of intensive exploitation in production, as well as the
"*' associated forms of monopoly capital.11 The renewed emphasis on free competi-
tion hides the re-assertion of monopoly capitalist interest within the State since
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the mid-1970s. Furthermore, the fact that the concept of freedom of movement is
restricted to only one pan of the African workforce, to the so-called 'settled urban
Black', hides an important change in the character of the African working class. It
obscures the fact of the advanced stage of proletarianisation of that section of the
workforce, the temporary contract worker, which is excluded from this freedom
of movement.19 For these workers the full force of movement controls
remain, as does the ideology of separate development and independent Black
States which justifies these controls.30 Apartheid ideology denies the existence of
this proletariat as pan of capital's industrial reserve army and hence the necessity
to secure the conditions of its reproduction.
A further effect of the co-existence of liberal and apartheid ideology in this
form is to help make possible the continued exclusion of the African popular
classes from direct participation within the primary centres of power of the State's
juridico-political apparatuses. This continues to apply to Africans defined as pan
of the 'settled urban population', and also, with renewed force, to those defined
as only 'temporarily present' within the towns. Whereas tn the past Africans were
defined by the State as South African non-citizens, they now become non-South
African citizens, that is, citizens of other nation States.31 Homeland relations with
South Africa become international relations, the problem of homeland develop-
ment one of foreign aid.
There are two kinds of recommendations in the RJekert Commission Report:
those involving changes in the legislation and regulations governing the labour
bureaux, and those involving a re-structuring of the bureaux themselves and their
relation to other branches of the State's administrative bureaucracy.
The legislation and regulations provide only a formal framework, a charter for
the running of the bureaux. The bureaux are the means of executing that part of
the State's programme which is formalised within the legislation. This distinction
is no less important than that between the State and classes in society. If the State
is a condensation of class relations, at one remove from those classes, then legisla-
tion is a distillation of the class relations expressed within the State and is, as it
were, at two remove from the underlying class relations. Thus the task of
deciphering class relations from their formal refracted expression within law is
doubly difficult. Furthermore, legislation has its own relative autonomy. This can
be seen from the fact that the practical operation of a-Stare apparatus may remain
unchanged despite a change in the legislation, and vice versa. The existence of
'dead letter* legislation is a well known phenomenon. This is an obvious-point,
and yet few attempts have been made in the analysis of the bureaux to distinguish
clearly between these two aspects." The legislation has often been taken to repre-
sent the actual functioning of the labour bureaux.11 With these provisos in mind
we turn to the proposed changes in the legislation in this section, and leave the
question of changes in the machinery of control to the next.
For convenience, two categories of recommendations may be dtstinguised:
those aimed at relaxing controls over movement and residence for certain sections
of the urban work-force and their families, and those aimed at intensifying con-
trols over other sections.
The liberalising recommendations of the Riekert Commission arc aimed
specifically at increasing the intra-urban mobility of a section of the urban African
population which qualifies under Section 10 (1) (a), (b) and (c) of the Black
{Urban Areas) Consolidation Act of 1945.34 Sub-Section 10 (1) is framed in the
The Role of the Labour Bureaux __ 159
negative.13 It states that 'No Black shall remain for more than 72 hours in a
prescribed area . . .', that is, in an urban area within that pan of South Africa
defined as the 'White area', unless that person meets certain conditions. Thus no
African has an absolute right to remain in an urban area, but only a qualified
right." As is well known, a person defined as a Black may qualify under Section
10 (1) (a) if that person has, since birth, resided continuously in that area; under
(b), if the person has worked continuously in that area for one employer for not
less than ten years or has lawfully resided continuously in the area for not less
than fifteen years; and under (c) if the person is the wife, unmarried daughter or
son under the age when he is liable to pay tax, and that person has entered the
area lawfully. A further legal category is introduced under Section 10 (1) (d). This
is the residual category of 'any other Black'. Exemption for people defined as 'any
other Black* is conditional upon permission being granted by a labour officer at
the labour bureau. This permission is subject, in the case of workseekers, to the
availability of employment, non-avail ability of suitable local labour and to the
availability of suitable accommodation.—
The reforms in the system of labour controls advocated by the Rickert
Commission are directed at the conditions of registration of workers and
employers at the labour bureaux. These are as follows:
1. No obligation should be placed on either workers to register themselves as
workseekers or on employers to register vacancies."
2. Workers who qualify under Section 10 (1) (a), (b) or (c) should be given a
standing authorisation to change employers without reporting to a labour
bureaux, subject to registration of the employment contract by the
employer.31
 ; . •-
3. . Section 10 (1) (a), {b) and (c) qualifications should be transferable from
one urban area to another, subject to the approval of the labour bureaux
concerned and the availability of approved housing.19
In addition to these measures relating to the individual worker, the Commis-
sion recommended that Africans with Section 10 (1) (a), (b) or (c) qualifications
should be allowed to have their wives and families join them, if approved housing
was available, irrespective of the area of origin of their families.40 All these recom-
mendations were accepted in the White Paper.41 \. . . • •, •
At the outset it should be recognised that these recommendations do provide
for a degree of liberalisation of the movement of the section of the urban African
workforce which has the legal qualifications. This increased mobility would place
them at a relative advantage on the labour market and would undoubtedly over
time strengthen the tendency already present for this section of the workforce to
occupy the better paid, more skilled places in production, including the expan-
ding category of supervisory, clerical and technical places.41 This would also tend
to deepen lines of division between strata of the African working class within the
sphere of production. ~r- • -.-
Increased freedom of movement for individuals qualifying under Section 10 (1)
(a), (b) and (c) also has a direct significance for the African urban perry
bourgeoisie, both old and new, as well as the rapidly expanding category of
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Africans occupying positions within the lower and middle echelons of the State
locai government bureaucracies.0 In conjunction with other measures proposed
by the Commission such as the relaxation of controls over traders,44 over building
and home ownership,41 and the participation of Africans in municipal affairs and
administration,4* restricted relaxation of intra-urban movement and residence
controls constitutes a blatant attempt not merely to accommodate, but to nurture
the growth of an African urban petty bourgeoisie, or what is popularly referred to
in South Africa as a 'Black middle class'.41
The intention of dividing the African population is a feature which permeates
the entire report — it is the major objective of the Rickert strategy in relation to
South Africa's popular classes. The strategy may well be full of inconsistencies
and limitation but it is essential to recognise that it provides for, and builds upon,
an existing material foundation in order to maintain and deepen divisions not
only between sections of the popular classes but also, importantly, between strata
of the working class itself. The strategy is not just a new cloak for the old apar-
theid system. Having acknowledged this it is now necessary to consider some of
the many limitations built into these liberalising measures.
Even for those who are intended to benefit from relaxation of registration re-
quirements, the advocated changes do not constitute a radical departure from
previous practice. It is notorious that despite the regulations, workers with
Section 10 (1) (a), (b) and (c) qualifications were in the practice of registering
contracts of employment only after having entered into them and that enforce-
ment of registration of vacancies has always been extremely difficult. Even in the
case of employment of Section 10 {1) (d) workers, employment contracts were in
many cases merely rubber stamped after the worker had been engaged, and not
before. This is to say nothing about the large numbers of workers in illegal
employment in the towns who fail to pass through the registration machinery at
all.41 As regards registration of Section 10 (1) (a), (b) and (c) workers, the Com-
mission's recommendations to a large extent regularise what was wide-spread
practice. This may well help to remove some of the arbitrariness with which
labour bureaux officials apply the regulations to this section of the workforce.
This relaxation of registration requirements only applies in its pure form to
movement between prescribed areas within a given Bantu Affairs Administration
Board. Movement from one Board area to another, which was ironically more
difficult for a person with an (a), (b) or (c) qualification than for one with a (d)
qualification,49 is made easier under the Riekert proposals, but still subject to the
authority of the labour bureaux concerned and the availability of housing.
The qualification that free movement between Board areas should be subject to
housing availability is extremely important. Given the massive shortage of hous-
ing for Africans in all the major urban-industrial areas it could act as a severe con-
straint on the freedom of Africans to move.30 For a large proportion of Africans,
freedom to move between Board areas will be conditional upon employment and
the provision of housing by their employers. . .•-
While unemployment and housing shortages remain chronic features of urban
life in South Africa, this conditional freedom will be meaningful primarily for
employers wishing to move their workforce from one Board area to another, and
only to a limited extent to individual Africans.31 • -
Now the crucial point to understand about the Riekert recommendations is
that even this limited relaxation of controls is entirely conditional upon the in-
>-,-••
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creased efficiency and severity of controls over the section of the urban African
population not considered to be 'established' in the towns. It is useful to quote the
Commission at some length on this: . • : . . .
Owing to the potentiaJ extent and nature of the migration of Blacks from
rural areas to urban areas, serious social and sociological welfare problems
will arise in urban areas in South Africa for both the established popula-
tions in the urban areas, White, Coloured, Asian and Black, and the new
entrants if the migration process is left uncontrolled . . . it will give rise
to large scale unemployment in urban areas, lower wages and a threat to
the interest of established inhabitants . '. . Control over the rate of
urbanisation is, in the light of circumstances in South Africa, an absolutely
essential social security measure.'2
*r Thus in equal measure to the attention given 10 the manner in which measures
t could be relaxed for the 'established* urban African population, the Commission
§ gives attention to means of increasing the efficiency and severity of control over
those defined as 'not established*. There are two broad categories of such con-
trols: influx concrol measures and expulsion measures. In order to grasp why this
distinction in control measures exists it is necessary to identify the categories of
b- Africans who do not qualify under Section 10 (1) (a), (b) or (c). The residual of
these categories, 'any other Black', has rwo sides to it, a positive and a negative
one. We have already mentioned the positive side: this refers to Section 10 (1) (d)
Africans. The negative side of this residual category is what the law in South
Africa defines as 'illegal Blacks'. That is, Africans either illegally employed or
illegally resident in South Africa. Influx control measures attempt to control the
movement of 'other Blacks' into the towns, expulsion measures provide the means
for dealing with those who have evaded the influx control measures,
'illegal Blacks'. •• • • . . . • - . • • •
Influx control measures may be divided into three areas, those applied to
physical movement, to employment contracts and to residence in the towns. The
major thrust of the Riekert proposals on influx control was to drop the 72-hour
restriction on Africans remaining in the towns, a measure applied largely to con-
trol physical movement, and intensify controls over employment and residence.
f^  The 72-hour control, when first introduced in 1952, was labelled the 'Gestapo
|J£ measure." The reason for this is that it provided for unrestricted powers of arrest
W over Africans remaining in an urban area without authorisation and placed the
t onus of proof that a person was entitled to remain in the area on the accused. It isa blatantly racially descriminatory measure. - - ,
& The proposed lifting of the 72 hour restriction has a number of implications
f) arising from the manner in which this control has traditionally been exercised.
•£' First, the control has been applied by officials of the BAABs and the Souch African
% Police in the form of street, bus and railway station checks and road blockades. It
*;'• is a mass measure which necessitates the production of the pass book as the basic
%': means of ascertaining the legal status of an individual. It allows for little
|p" discrimination amongst categories of individuals.-This means that Urge numbers
i{£ of Africans who qualify under Section 10(1) (a), (b) and (c) are forced to carry
•M'- their pass books and are subject to the effect of controls, including imprisonment,
I
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if they fail to produce passes. This is despite their status as 'established urban
dwellers'." ? • , -
Lifting the 72-hour registration is thus a vital part of the general strategy of the
Commission to provide for finer discrimination between sections of the African
population in the towns. Recent events have shown how difficult this is for the
State. This difficulty makes it all the more imperative, given its insistence on the
maintenance of control, to intensify control measures in the spheres of unemploy-
ment and housing." .
Controls over employment also have a physical dimension. They shift the locus
of the exercise of control to the workplace. But registration of service contracts
may equally well be associated with the exercise of controls outside of the
workplace. Registration, and particularly the permanent record of this (or the
absence of such a record) in an individual's book, is an important means of
establishing the individual's right to be in an area, wherever the control is applied.
The Riekert Commission Report recommended that the onus should be on the
employer to ensure that his workers were registered. This recommendation, and
the fine for illegal employment of Africans, was accepted in the White Paper and
has already been instituted. On the other hand, the suggested dropping of fines
imposed on Africans found working illegally was not accepted by the White
Paper." - . . . . . . .
It remains to be seen whether the imposition of heavy fines on employers will
continue and whether this will have the intended effect of eliminating unlawful
employment. If previous experience is anything to go by, it seems likely that
pressure from employers to relax these controls will in time prove
overwhelming." Despite fines, the temptation for employers to take on illegal
workers will continue to be very great, given the extremely weak position of such
workers. For their pan, workers, who arc, in ever-increasing numbers, faced with
unemployment and starvation, have little choice in the matter. They will continue
to seek employment, despite the laws.
In so far as controls at the workplace prove ineffective, it is the place of
residence to which attention is most likely to be drawn in implementing influx
control measures. Here a distinction must be drawn between control of illegal
residents in the white suburbs and control in the townships and squatter camps.
In the former, as mentioned in the first lines of this paper, there has already been
an attempt to apply the Riekan proposals, apparently with some degree of suc-
cess." In the latter a very different set of problems arises. First, controls cannot be
exercised under present circumstances in the townships without this having a
direct impact on householders. Many householders depend upon renting out
space to paying tenants or house relatives not in possession of the necessary per-
mits. There is no reason to believe that night pass raids on this section of the
population will be any better received than road blocks and street searches.
Thus it is that the very shift; in the form and locus of influx control which the
Riekart Commission believed was an essential pre-requisite for liberalisation in
other spheres, had embedded in it the seeds of its own failure. It may well be that
it is ultimately in the townships that influx control will be most vigorously
applied. If so, then it is precisely the section of the population that the Commis-
sion was most concerned to placate which will be most severely affected.
 :
Of the battery of expulsion measures'9 available in the Urban Areas Act, two in
particular are important in bringing out the intentions of the Riekan Commis-
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sion. These are Section 14, which provides for 'Repatriation of Blacks who re-
main in prescribed areas* and Section 29 which provides for the 'Manner of deal-
ing with idle or undesirable Blacks1.
Section 14 is the primary mass expulsion measure applied by the courts. In
evidence put before the Commission the measure was described as 'an exercise in
futility*. It entails great expenditure, and those 'repatriated* under this measure
'are often found to be back at the place from which they were repatriated before
their conductors'. Its failure to contain illegal employment and residence is
attributed to [he fact that fewer and fewer suitable places can be found to which
people can be 'repatriated'.60 In effect mass expulsion under Section 14 increas-
ingly involves no more than the forced perpetual oscillation of a fully
prolctarianised workforce unable to obtain the necessary permits to work and
reside in the towns and yet unable to survive without wage labour there. The
Commission's position on this section is important:
The Commission cannot, in the light of its recommendations in connec-
tions with influx control , . . recommend the repeal of Section 14 of the
Act. Justice can be done to the section only if there is dynamic development
of the Black States, stricter action is taken against employers unlawfully
taking Blacks into employment and residential control is efficiently applied.
Furthermore, the Commission recommended that:
It should also be possible to apply (he repatriation procedure without the
commission of an offence being a pre-requisite, in the case of persons who
are in the area concerned without having residential qualifications and who
are working in that area without authorisation.61
Far from seeking a means of dealing with the underlying causes of the move-
ment of workers to the towns, the 'exercise in futility' is to continue to be the
major means of dealing with those who attempt to by-pass the influx control
measures. . .
The other important expulsion measure is Section 19 of the Urban Areas Act.
This section provides for the arrest of any African suspected of being idle or
undesirable. An 'idle person' is a 'Black' who though capable of being employed is
normally unemployed, has failed to accept employment offered to him by a
labour bureaux or has failed to keep such employment for a specified length of
time. The definition of 'undesirable' is equally wide-ranging and includes people
convicted of brewing or supplying intoxicating liquor, public violence, possession
of a firearm, injury to property and so on. A person declared to be an idle or
undesirable person by a Bantu Affairs Commissioner may be ordered to be detain-
ed in a retreat, rehabilitation centre, farm colony or rescue home or similar
institution or sent to a rural village or settlement." -
Section 29 is a measure which has had as its primary objective the control of a
particular strata of the urban proletariat, the lumpenproletariat. Its practical
application has, however, never achieved the fine discrimination intended by the
law. This is in part because the real boundaries between the lumpenproletariat
and the active and floating industrial reserve armies are never clear or fixed.*1
This is a strata of the proletariat which is continously being swelled by the growth
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of unemployment amongst urban workers, as well as by workers entering the
towns from the countryside who, after periods of employment, find themselves
falling into the same category. •
In a High Court ruling on the application of this section in 1940, the following
observations were made: ' . . . the provisions of this legislation are drastic and
give extra-ordinary powers to magisterial officers of a kind unknown to any
system of jurisprudence and . . . in consequence, it is the court's duty to
narrowly scrutinise proceedings purporting to be taken under them in order to see
that the proceedings conform to the terms of the statute*." . . :
Like Section 10 of the Urban Areas Act this measure has been used as a means
of mass arrest. But its use as a means of mass conviction and expulsion has been
much more circumscribed. This is not simply a question of reluctance on the part
of the courts to apply hasty convictions under a draconian law.63 The difficulty
also stems from the growing size of the industrial reserve army in the towns and
the rapid proleterianisation of the rural workforce. This has meant that deporta-
tion to a rural area has on its own become an inadequate means of securing the
control of the deportee. Increasingly the rural village or settlement, in order to
perform its function of control, has had to be replaced by rural prisons or work-
colonies. These are the 'rehabilitation centres' that the Commission discovered
were 'over-full'." Thus effective application of Section 29 in the present cir-
cumstances of South African development requires an expansion of the entire in-
frastructure of direct repressive control normally associated with prisons.
The Riekert Commission recommended that Section 29 be replaced by the
application of the appropriate measures under the Abuse of Dependence-
Producing Substances and Rehabilitation Centres Act of 1971.6T This is in line
with its strategy of relaxing controls which have an adverse effect on the
'established' sections of the urban African population. It also accords with its at-
tempt to deracialise the legislation.
But the removal of Section 29 may prove difficult. The White Paper gave only
qualified acceptance of the idea.41 Like the 72-hour restriction, Section 29 is both
embarrassing for its blatantly repressive and racist character, and an extremely
powerful control measure. Its repeal will be conditional upon more vigorous and
efficient controls being applied in other spheres. . . . . .
Of all the changes contemplated by the Riekert Commission those relating to
the restructuring of the State control apparatuses are potentially of the greatest
significance in determining the character and future role of the labour bureaux.
These changes are not fully spelt out by the Commission (which left the detailed
restructuring of the system to the Public Service Commission). It is therefore
necessary to rest our analysis and comments on the blueprint contained in the
report. • •'•>-'- - - " - ' - . • . • •_••.- .
The most important single recommendation put forward was that involving the
transfer of control over the labour bureaux from the Department of Plural Rela-
tions and Development (PRAD) to the Department of Labour.69 The Department
of Labour was not, however, to take over the running of the bureaux entirely, it
was merely to oversee this running. In practice the bureaux would continue to be
run by the Bantu Affairs Administration Boards on an 'agency' basis, . • 'c; ,
Now, it is important to note that the loss of the labour bureaux by PRAD was
intended to be simply one slice in a thorough carving up of that department
resulting in the redistribution of its so-called 'functional functions' to other
f ' • • • • • -
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departments. All labour functions' including employment services and training
were to go to the Department of Labour and all law functions' to the Department
% of Justice. PRAD was to retain essentially two transitional functions: . •
% ' - • •
> 1. *the constitutional development towards independence of the Black States,
and the administration of the Black States'; and
2. the administration of 'Black Communities' in the White areas.70
In attempting to understand the significance and limitations of these recom-
mendations it is necessary to focus on the character of the Bantu Affairs
Administration Boards {Boards or BAAB's), which provide the over-arching
Iff. apparatuses responsible for the running of the labour bureaux as well as the
'{.-;. administration of almost all facets of the lives of urban Africans outside of the
immediate sphere of production.71
f'[ The establishment of the BAAB'S in 1971 took place at the end of a long phase
|-_- o( economic stabilisation and at the highest point in the development of
authoritarianism in the apartheid State. The Boards were in essence a product of
pressures emanating from capital, particularly industrial capital, for a restructur-
ing of relations of production and reproduction which had been thrown out of
joint by the previous phase of expansion and the growing in appropriateness of
the State's reproduction policies. This fact, that the Boards rose essentially from
the demands of capital in a phase when the popular African classes were weak
and disorganised, has indelibly marked the structure of the Boards. It is this
which accounts for the absence of any form of democratic representation within
the Boards, even of the limited kind which had existed when labour bureaux were
under the white local authorities. It accounts in particular for the total absence of
any form of representation of the African urban classes within the apparatuses.71
This characteristic of the BAAB's, their divorce from the expression of local
class interests accounts for their monolithic aspect and juggernaut pursuit of the
apartheid programme. In relation to the labour bureaux it helps to explain the
stria subordination of the labour allocation function to that of influx control,
» and the consequent frustration of employers and despair of workers,
f The relative impermeability of the BAABs to changes in the balance of local
class forces has a contradictory effect. In periods of stabilisation it appears to
enhance the power of the State and help carry forward its programme. But in
periods of de-stabilsation, the impermeability becomes a barrier to accommoda-
tion and adaptation to these changed forces and thus threatens the cohesion of
the State.
tt is in the light of these observations that the Riekert proposals should be
understood. Recognising the relative incapacity of the BAABs in their existing
form to adapt to changing class forces in the mid-1970s, the Commission recom-
mended that the activities of the Boards, particularly the labour bureaux system,
should be decentralised.71 Decentralisation meant a move to the townships of
labour bureaux offices. More importantly it meant increased accountability of the
Boards to the Community Councils. The precise form in which this is to be
organised is not spelt out, but the direction of change intended is clear: the
Boards, the Commission argues, should inter alia be engaged 'in the development
of the Community Council system and the administration of Black residential
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areas in co-operation with Community Councils for as long as may be necessary
Decentralisation of the labour bureaux is just one aspect of the proposed
re-structuring of the apparatuses. As important as this is the transfer of ultimate
control over the running of the labour bureaux to the Department of Labour. The
significance of this proposed move was that it was intended as a step towards
de-racialisation of the labour bureaux. The Department of Labour has tradi-
tionally been associated with the execution of legislation such as the Wages Act,71
which is less explicitly racist than legislation executed by PRAD.
There is, however, a deeper underlying motive. This is the attempt to improve
the employment service functions of the labour bureaux and to down-play their
directly repressive functions. Improvement of the labour allocation function of
the labour bureaux in the urban area has a direct economic significance in so far
as it increases the mobility, and hence the efficiency of allocation, of the urban
workforce. The down-playing of the repressive function of the urban bureaux
and their proposed specialisation in the provision of employment services for
workers and other classes of urban Africans qualifying under Section 10 (1) (a),
(b) and (c) is yet another facet of the attempt to deepen the divide between
sections of the African population. . . . .
The potential affects of these proposals, if implemented should not be under-
estimated. They point towards the creation of a dual labour bureaux system, the
one essentially concerned with providing employment services for individuals
from all racial groups who have the requisite qualifications, and the other with
the increasingly stria enforcement of influx control measures on those without
these qualifications. . . .
The foundations of this dualism are extended in a further proposal of the Com-
mission, which is that 'assembly centres' be established at suitable places on the
borders between South African and the 'Black States'. These centres, to be run by
the BAABs, are intended to regulate the recruitment, registration and terms of
sojourn of Africans from the 'Black States1 wishing to take up employment and
residence in the rest of South Africa.1* .
It is now necessary to show the limitations built into these measures. As regards
the attempted separation of control and allocation functions through the creation
of a dual labour bureaux system, this can do little more than transform the con-
tradictory internal functioning of the labour bureaux into a contradiction in the
relations between apparatuses. To the extent that this separation is achieved, and
this is itself doubtful, it may be expected that increased tension in the relations
between the Department of Labour and the Bantu Affairs Administration Boards
will develop. .. -. -
There is a further reason to suspect that little in the way of real change either in
the form of increased mobility or in the form of decreased repression will come
from these proposals. The reason is that it is precisely these apparatuses which are
most responsible for the execution of the repressive and racially discriminatory
policies of the State that are left intact by the Riekert proposals. The Bantu Affairs
Administration Boards are old dogs which do not easily learn new tricks. Left
structurally intact, as the proposals suggest they should be, their chances of
becoming non-racial, benevolent welfare apparatuses serving the 'Black Com-
munities' in the 'White areas* are small. As regards their activities in the rural
areas and especially at the proposed 'assembly centres', they were never intended
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to do anything other than increase the full range of repressive controls over the
disqualified African population.
Conclusion . . . . . .
The discussion in the preceeding section has been limited to an analysis of the pro-
posals put forward by the Riekert Commission for changes in the legislation and
machinery of control over the African population in South Africa. An attempt
was made to show the class intentions behind these proposals, par-
ticularly the intentions of the dominant classes in relation to the popular African
classes. In addition, the internally contradictory character of the proposals was
discussed as well as the self-imposed limits on their scope of application. In view
of these limitations it is extremely doubtful that even the narrow reforms desired
by the Commission will be secured. -
These are limits imposed within the terms of reference of the Commission. In
order to understand the more fundamental limits it is necessary to step outside of
the Commission's terms of reference. This allows us to see that its attempts to
resolve the underlying contradictions currently developing within South Africa do
little more than reproduce them in a different form.
The attempt to resolve the mounting crisis of unemployment, or, more
fundamentally, of reproduction of the workforce in the towns, docs little more
than displace and re-create the problem in the rural areas of South Africa and in
its neighbouring countries. Furthermore, with every widening of the gap between
the material conditions of the urban workforce and that of the excluded pro-
letariat, the pressure, both from capital and from the excluded workers
themselves, to break the legal barriers against employment and residence in the
towns increases. This in its turn threatens the very section of the workforce which
is the object of the protective measures. Thus the categories imposed by the State,
Section 10(1) (a), (b), (c) and {d) workers, 'illegal' and 'legal blacks', arc
themselves underminded by the necessities of the further development of
capitalism. Capital, in short, continuously tends to undermine the forms of con-
tainment of its own contradictions. . . . .
But there is no inevitability in this process. These are contradictions which may
just as well continue to be effectively managed as give rise to further crises and re-
structuring. The intentions contained in the Riekert proposals may or may not be
carried through. What will decide this is not their contradictory character so
much as the course of the struggle for and against their implementation.
I wish to thank the Labour Research Committee, which has recently
completed the first detailed empirical study of the labour bureaux in the
rural areas, for valuable discussions on the subject. I am also greatly in-
debted to those who attended the seminars I gave in mid-April 1980 in
Cape Town, and particularly to Mike Morris and Johnny Myers for in-
valuable discussions on a number of theoretical issues. These discussions
did not always end in agreement and I must emphasise that I alone am
responsible for what is contained in the following pages. - -
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